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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STELLA WATKINS, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of AR THUR 
DONALD WATKINS, 
Plaintiff-Countcrdef endant-Respondent, 
and 
STEVEN G. NEIGHBORS, as Trustee of the A. 
DON WATKINS REVOCABLE TRUST 
DATED MAY 1, 2009, RESTATEMENT 
DATED JULY 8, 2011, 
Counterdefendant, 
V. 
ARNOLD DOUGLAS WATKINS, 
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant, 
and 
BRIAND. WATKINS and ROBYNLEE 
WATKINS, husband and wife, and the Marital 
Community composed thereof, 
Defendants-Counterclaimants, 
and 
DONALD EUGENE WATKINS and KATIE 
WATKINS, husband and wife, and the Marital 
Community composed thereof; and VIRGINIA 
WATKINS, 
Defendants. 
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DOCKET NO. 44036-2016 
Ada County Case No. CV-OC-0921373 
2 9 2016 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Ada County 
Honorable Melissa Moody, District Judge presiding. 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
K f'Vin p. ninim: 
Sarah Hallock-I ayne 
Dinius & Associates, PLLC 
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 130 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main St., Ste. 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701 
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The Trial Court Improperly Concluded That No Notice of Acceleration o:r Notice of 
Default Was Required Under the Real Estate Contract. 
"The Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant ever received a default 
notice on the real estate contract. Similarly, Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant ever 
received notice of acceleration."1 The Plaintiff did not give notice of acceleration by letter that 
all sums under the note were immediately due and owing. Similarly, the Complaint filed by 
Plaintiff did not declare an acceleration of the note. Instead, in the First Amended Complaint, 
"Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter an order compelling Doug to produce any 
and all records relating to Doug's Note, including a detailed accounting, compelling Doug to 
comply with the terms of Doug's Note, bringing the same current .... "2 Despite there being no 
notice of acceleration coupled with the Plaintiffs failure to accelerate the Note in its First 
Amended Complaint, the Court declared the real estate contract was accelerated and awarded 
Plaintiff $528,640.43 in damages.3 The Court found a notice of acceleration was not required 
under the contract or under Washington law for that matter. Defendant filed the instant appeal, 
in part, based on the Court's erroneous analysis of the contract and Washington law. 
1. The Contract Required Plaintiff to Declare All Amounts Immediately Due and 
Payable Effecting a True Acceleration. 
In this case Doug does not dispute he failed to make payment as required under the 
contract. Doug also does not dispute that such failure to make payment constitutes a default 
under the contract. Further, Doug did not take issue with the Court's order finding him in default 
1 Clerk's Record ("R."), p. 1272. 
2 R., p. 83. 
3 For sake of clarity the parties are referred to as "Don" or "Plaintiff' and "Doug" or "Defendant." 
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dispute over how Doug 
1s supposed to have knowledge that Plaintiff has declared amounts due hereunder or 
otherwise and pursuant to this Contract immediately due and payable so as to effect a true 
acceleration of the entire balance of the unpaid obligation secured hereby."4 Doug contends 
Plaintiff and the Court have misinterpreted the option to accelerate under the contract, especially 
in light of Washington case law on the issue. The contract provides Plaintiff with the option to 
declare all amounts immediately due and payable, effecting a true acceleration.5 Additionally, 
the contract permits Plaintiff to make that declaration without further demand or notice.6 That 
means, Plaintiff did not have to demand the default be cured prior to exercising the option to 
accelerate the note. While Plaintiff clearly had the ability to accelerate the note upon Doug's 
failure to make payment, he has to notify Doug he has exercised that option. Not only is 
notification of acceleration required under Washington law, the contract requires Plaintiff 
declare the acceleration of the note. 7 Moreover, to say Plaintiff doesn't have to notify Doug he 
has accelerated the note defies common sense. If the seller has not provided notice, how is the 
purchaser to know acceleration has occurred? 
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint unequivocally demonstrates Plaintiff did not exercise 
his option to accelerate the note notwithstanding Doug's failure to make the August 2010 
payment. In fact, Plaintiff's requested relief in the First Amended Complaint was the complete 
4 Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 37,, 23; R., pp. 361-376,, 23. 
5 Id 
6 Id. 
7 A.A.C. Corporation v. Reed, 73 Wn. 2d 612,440 P.2d 465 (1968). 
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opposite of an acceleration 
default be cured. 
a request 
2. Washington Law Required Plaintiff Provide Doug with Notice of Acceleration. 
the 
Respondent's analysis of the case law as it relates to the required of notice of acceleration 
and as the facts of this case is flawed. The Washington Supreme Court, in Weinberg and later 
reaffirmed in Glassmaker, established the "law on acceleration" by defining when acceleration 
of the maturity of a debt occurs."8 In Weinberg, the Court stated that "[S]ome affirmative action 
is required, some action by which the holder of the note makes known to the payors that he 
intends to declare the whole debt due. "9 Nevertheless, the Trial Court concluded that no notice of 
acceleration was required by mistakenly relying on Jacobson v. McClanahan where Court held 
that an election to accelerate payments does not require a notice of intention to accelerate. The 
Appellant herein would agree that the language of the real estate contract similarly did not 
require Respondent provide further demand or notification of his intent to accelerate the note. 
However, Respondent was never relieved of the requirement that he make a "clear and 
unequivocal statement of acceleration."10 
Simply stated, the trial court's ruling that Respondent was not required to provide notice of 
acceleration is fundamentally at odds with Washington law. For example, in A.A.C. Corp. v. 
Reed, the court held: 
8 4518 S. 256th, LLC v. Gibbon, 73834-8-1 (Court of Appeals Washington, Division l); citing Glassmaker v. Ricard, 
23 Wn.App. 35, 38,593 P.2d 179 (1979); Weinbergv. Naher, 51 Wash. 591. 
9 Weinberg 51 Wash at 594. 
10 Glassmaker 23 Wn.App. at 38. 
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[I]t is plain that the court is committed to the doctrine *** that mere 
default in payment does not mature the whole debt, whether there be 
words of option the agreement or not Such a provision hastening the 
date of maturity of the whole debt is for the benefit of the payee, and if he 
does not manifest any intention to claim it, Before tender is actually made, 
there is in law no default such as will cause the maturity of the debt Before 
the regular time provided in the agreement. 11 
Hear the question becomes, did Plaintiff ever unambiguously exercise his option to 
accelerate Doug's debt? The answer is no. Plaintiffs Complaint did not declare the entire debt 
due and owing. Instead, the Complaint served as a notice of default to Doug and demand that he 
cure the default. In Puget Sound Mut. Sav. Bank v. Li/lions, when Mr. and Mrs. Lillions failed to 
pay the required monthly installments, the bank explicitly exercised its option to accelerate the 
debt twice over. 12 First, the Bank filed a Complaint in which it declared the entire indebtedness 
due. 13 Second, the Bank sent the Lillions a registered letter advising that the Bank had elected to 
declare the entire debt due and that an action had been filed in superior court. 14 In the present 
case, Plaintiff took no affirmative action whatsoever to notify Doug he had exercised his option 
to declare the note immediately due and owing. Thus, the Trial Court's finding that Doug owed 
$528,640.43 on the note should be reversed. 
B. The Trial Court's Damages Award is Based on Speculation and Guesswork. 
The Trial Court by all accounts chose to ignore the obvious contradictory and unsound 
approach to the calculation of damages as presented by Plaintiffs witness Denise McClure. "The 
burden is upon the plaintiff to prove not only that it was injured but that its injury was the result 
11 73 Wn.App. 612,616,440 P.2d 465 (1968); Coman v. Peters, 52 Wash. 574,578, 100 P. 1002,1003 (1909). 
12 50 Wash.2d 799,802,314 P.2d 935,938 (Wash. 1957). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
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the defendant's both amount and must 
certainty. "'Reasonable certainty' not mean that damages need to be 
'mathematical exactitude,' but it does require a plaintiff to prove that damages are not merely 
speculative."16 Proving damages requires more than guesswork or speculation. 
Here, Plaintiff's evidence of damages is based entirely on speculation, guesswork and 
records unquestionably lacking in trustworthiness. The underlying data upon which Ms. 
McClure based her ever-changing opinion of the amount Doug owed under the Note was, 
without question, unreliable, incomplete, and inaccurate, not to mention created by an alleged 
perpetrator of fraud. Plaintiffs continued assertion that Ms. McClure's calculation of damages 
has been proven to a degree of reasonable certainty is simply illogical. Ms. McClure's opinions 
and assumptions rely on inherently untrustworthy records. The old adage "garbage in garbage 
out" comes to mind when considering the facts of this case related to the issue of damages. 
Doug contends that Ms. McClure's findings established Brian Watkins' accounting records were, 
in effect, "garbage."17 After all, Ms. McClure found Brian Watkins' bookkeeping and 
accounting records were misleading, incomplete, inaccurate, and failed to maintain critical 
documentation. 18 Further, that the records involved extensive commingling of funds and 
systematic deletion of transaction detail which limited an independent analysis and evaluation of 
the recorded transactions and rendered a complete reconstruction of the accounting records 
15 Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604,611 (2007). 
16 Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Const. & Trucking, Inc., 264 P.3d 400, 151 Idaho 761 (Idaho 2011), citing Griffith at 
740. 
17 Trial Defense Exhibits G, H, I and K; R., pp. 239-290, 494-499, and 811-826. 
18 Id. 
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impossible. 19 to that 
owed $528,640.43 under Estate Contract, was accurate and reliable, despite being 
based on "garbage" accounting records and practices. 
Contrary to Respondent's assertion the Trial Court's damages award is not supported by 
substantial or competent evidence. Despite having "multiple witnesses" on the issue of damages, 
Respondent was unable to overcome one undisputable fact, Brian Watkins' unreliable, 
untrustworthy accounting and bookkeeping records. Respondent seemingly attempts to distance 
himself from Brian's inaccurate and incomplete records with the testimony of Sharon 
Wadsworth that she began tracking all payments made by Doug since late 2009.20 Assuming 
Ms. Wadsworth's accounting was accurate, that does not negate the original accounting records 
created by Brian Watkins. Respondent's portrayal of Ms. Wadsworth's testimony is not only 
overstated, but likewise unpersuasive. For example, Ms. Wadsworth was unable to testify about 
how much she owed on her note or the amount she paid to satisfy the remaining debt she owed 
on the note.21 
The Court's ultimate conclusion, that Plaintiff had proven the damages to a degree of 
reasonable certainty, contradicts its own Findings of Fact, specifically: 
19 Id. 
To say that Plaintiff's financial books were scrambled is, in the words of the 
conservator, 'a very nice way to put what r found in Brian's accounting.' 
Plaintiff's finances were a mess. The conservator received and reviewed 
approximately 100 banker's boxes of records in conjunction with this case, but 
was unable to reconstruct Plaintiffs finances. 22 
20 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 115, I. 23 - p. 116. I. 4. 
21 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 134, II. 14-24. 
22 R., pp. 1271-1270; Trial Transcript Day I, p. 59, II. 6-7. 
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Based on the foregoing and for the reasons previously stated in Appellant's Plaintiff failed 
to prove damages to a degree of reasonable certainty. Plaintiff's expert calculated damages 
based on the erroneous assumption that there had been an acceleration of the Note. Most 
importantly, the root of Ms. McClure's wildly different calculations were the same accounting 
records of Brian Watkins which she declared, unequivocally, to be lacking critical 
documentation, inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading.23 
C. The Compensation Agreement was Valid and Enforceable. 
The evidence presented at trial established the compensation agreement to be a valid and 
enforceable contract. The trial court, however, concluded the compensation agreement lacked the 
required consideration to form a valid contract relying, in part on Co/lord v. Cooley.24 Doug 
maintains the facts herein are distinguishable from those in Co/lord, in that the instant 
compensation agreement represents far more than just an unenforceable promise to pay. A 
review of the evidence at trial established sufficient consideration to find the compensation 
agreement to be a valid contract. For instance, the plain language of the compensation agreement 
wherein Plaintiff was to pay Doug $3,000 per month for life as a retirement/disability benefit, 
which expressly states is being done "[i]n consideration of the lifetime of work done by Payee 
[Douglas Watkins] for Payor [ Arthur Donald Watkins]. "25 Somewhat unique to this case is the 
fact that Don, as Doug's employer, did not provide Doug with health insurance or retirement 
23 Trial Transcript Day 1, p. 93, l. 7 -p. 98, l. 6; Defense Trial Exhibits G, Hand I; and, R., pp. 239-290 and 811-
826. 
24 92 Idaho 789,451 P.2d 535, 538 (1969). 
25 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 178, l. 7 - p. 179, l. 20. 
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26 Doug Watkins 
month for their lifetime of work for Respondent and injuries sustained therefrom is contrary to 
the conclusion that the services rendered by Doug to Don were "gratuitous."27 Moreover, Don's 
April 21, 1998 affidavit, filed in his Utah divorce action, dispels any notion that the monthly 
payments made to Doug for injuries sustained while working for Don were at gift or, "at most a 
personal or moral obligation."28 
The Trial Court's ruling the compensation agreement was unenforceable based on a lack 
of consideration failed to recognize and consider critical information in its analysis: The prior 
discussions between Respondent and his sons detailing the terms of the retirement/disability 
payments dating back to 2000; the undisputed history of payments by Don to Doug in the 
amount of $3,000 per month; and the fact that the 2009 compensation agreement signed by Brian 
Watkins simply verified what was already happening. 
D. Brian Watkins, as Don's agent, Had the Express Authority to Execute the 
Compensation Agreement, Thereby Binding Don to Said Agreement with Doug. 
"For an agent to bind a principal to a third party in contract the agent must have actual or 
apparent authority."29 Pursuant to the General Power of Attorney dated October 24, 2000, Brian 
Watkins had the actual express authority to execute the compensation agreement at issue herein. 
Consequently, Don is bound by the terms of the compensation agreement pertaining to Doug, 
26 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 216, I. 23 - p. 217, I. 9. 
27 Respondent's Brief, p. 18. 
28 R., p. 1278; Defendant's Trial Exhibit B, at ,r 10. 
29 Huyett v. Idaho State University, 140 Idaho 904, 104 P.3d 946 (2004); citing Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Servs., 
Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 944, 854 P.2d 280, 287 (Ct.App.1993). 
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regardless whether or not Brian acted good faith and the principal' s interest. 
However, the Trial Court erroneously declared the compensation agreement invalid because 
Brian Watkins' execution of the agreement did not comply with Idaho Code § 15-12-114(1).30 
There is no dispute that since 2000, well before the written compensation agreement, Brian 
Watkins had been exercising his authority under the GPOA to pay Doug $3,000 per month for 
reasons previously stated and this was done with Don's knowledge and approval.31 Not only did 
the GPOA provide Brian Watkins with the authority to pay Doug $3,000 per month, it also gave 
him the authority to memorialize the payment of these "retirement/disability benefits" by 
executing the Compensation Agreement. Therefore, as Don's agent, Brian had the actual express 
authority to bind Don to Doug in contract, specifically the Compensation Agreement. 
Furthermore, according to paragraph 6.00 (Third-Party Reliance) of the GPOA: "Third 
parties may rely upon the representations of my agent as to all matters relating to any power 
granted to my agent, and no person who may act in reliance upon the representations of my agent 
or the authority granted to my agent shall incur any liability to me or my estate as a result of 
permitting my agent to exercise any power."32 Doug testified he never doubted Brian's authority 
to act on his father's behalf because Brian had been handling all of his father's affairs for 15 to 
20 years and that Don told him any time Doug had a question he should go to Brian. 33 Doug had 
no reason to doubt Brian had the authority to effectuate the $3,000 monthly retirement/disability 
benefits he received every month, especially since the payments mirrored exactly what Doug and 
30 R., p. 1276. 
31 Trial Transcript Day 2, p. 184, I. 24 - p. 185, I. 8. 
32 R., p. 304. 
33 Trial Transcript, p. 181, I. 15-17, p. 182, I. 13-19, p. 184, l. 13-14. 
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discussed. authority 
to i...., ......... ",., the terms his retirement/disability benefit payments to writing compensation 
agreement as he had been "paid for years without a piece of paper."34 
E. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Failing to Apply the Doctrine of Judicial 
J?.1;1fnnn.,f 
....... U'.'-"l'I'"'·· 
Doug maintains, contrary to the Trial Court's analysis, the evidence clearly demonstrated 
Plaintiff played fast and loose with the courts which is the exactly the type of conduct the 
doctrine of judicial estoppels is intended to prevent. Plaintiff's positions in the two litigations 
were not consistent. Plaintiff unquestionably gained an advantage in his divorce proceeding by 
acknowledging his obligation to Doug. Then, in the instant proceeding Plaintiff changed this 
position contending he had no obligation to Doug. Plaintiff's change in his position undeniably 
was to gain an advantage in this litigation. The Court abused its discretion by sanctioning 
Plaintiffs obvious fast and loose play when it when it declined to invoke the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel. 
F. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Declaring Plaintiff the Prevailing Party 
and Awarding Plaintiff's Requested Fees and Costs. 
In response to Plaintiffs Brief on the issue of attorney fees and costs and the Trial 
Court's award of attorney fees and costs, Doug remains resolute in its position that the Trial 
Court did not reach its decision to award attorney fees and costs by an "exercise of reason."35 
Though not controlling, the Idaho Court of Appeals' analysis in Medical Recovery Services, LLC 
v. Jones, on issue of fee awards is relevant and applicable to the case at hand: 
34 Trial Transcript, p. 181, I. 9-10. 
35 Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486-87, 65 P. 3d 502, 508-09 (2003). 
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court may not use the award or denial of attorney fees to sense 
justice beyond the judgment rendered on the underlying dispute, provide indirect 
relief from an adverse judgment, or penalize a party for misdeeds during the 
litigation. Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 
Idaho 716, 720, 117 P.3d 130, 134 (2005); Evans v. Sawtooth Partners, 111 Idaho 
381, 387, 723 P.2d 925, 931 (Ct. App. 1986). Nevertheless, a court need not 
blindly accept the figures advanced by the attorney and may disallow fees that 
\Vere tL.1111ecessai~l)' and wueasonably~ incurred. Crcy1 ffla/l of Idaho, Inc. v. 
Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P.2d 324, 326 (Ct. App. 1985). Thus, 
although the time and labor actually expended by an attorney is to be considered, 
it is also to be evaluated under a standard of reasonableness. Med Recovery 
Servs., LLC v. Jones, 145 Idaho 106, 110, 175 P.3d 795, 799 (Ct. App. 2007). 'An 
attorney cannot spend his time extravagantly and expect to be compensated by the 
party who loses at trial. Hence, a court may disallow fees that were unnecessarily 
and unreasonably incurred or that were the product of attorney churning. '(internal 
quotations and citations omitted).36 
Similarly, Doug remains resolute that the Trial Court erred in determining Plaintiff to be 
the prevailing party in this action. Doug's arguments set forth in his opening brief sufficiently set 
forth the basis to reverse the Trial Court's ruling and find Doug the prevailing party. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Doug request the Court reverse the trial court, vacate the 
judgment against Doug and the award of attorney fees and costs. Further, Doug requests this 
Court find Plaintiff in breach of the compensation agreement and award damages and attorney 
fees and costs in favor of Doug. 
36 145 Idaho 106, 110, 175 P.3d 795 (App. 2007). 
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day of November, 
DINIUS LAW 
By: ~---'~--..__ 
Kevin£. Dinius 
Sara/ Hallock-} ayne 
Attorneys for Defendant/ Appellant 
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